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Abstract: 
 
With the extensive use of AI in various fields, the issue of AI security has become more 
significant. The AI data poisoning attacks will be the most threatening approach against AI 
security after the adversarial examples. As the continuous updating of AI applications online, the 
data pollution models can be uploaded by attackers to achieve a certain malicious purpose. 
Recently, the research on AI data poisoning attacks is mostly out of practice and use self-built 
experimental environments so that it cannot be as close to reality as adversarial example attacks. 
This article’s first contribution is to provide a solution and a breakthrough for the 
aforementioned issue with research limitations, to aim at data poisoning attacks that target real 
businesses, in this case: data poisoning attacks on real Go AI. We install a Trojan virus into the 
real Go AI that manipulates the AI’s behavior. It is the first time that we succeed in manipulating 
complicated AI and provide a reliable approach to the AI data poisoning attack verification 
method. The method of building Trojan in this article can be expanded to more practical 
algorithms for other fields such as content recommendation, text translation, and intelligent 
dialogue. 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
With the extensive use of AI in various fields, the issue of AI security has become more 
prevalent1. From early researches on attacks that escape detections against samples2-5 to more 
recent researches on AI data poisoning attacks that have been on the rise6-9, the number of 
researches on AI algorithm attacks has been steadily increasing.   
 
Regarding researches conducted on AI data poisoning attacks, most rely on simplistic models of 
self-built algorithms that are out of touch with reality. The data set given is usually incomplete 
and inaccurate as well. While reviewing research on countering sample attacks, we found it 
difficult to create breakthroughs that affect the physical world due to these limitations. What we 
need to find is sample attack targets that mimic practical real-life situations, to conduct 
researches on attacks such as ones affecting self-driving cars.  
 
This article’s first contribution is to provide a solution and a breakthrough for the 
aforementioned issue with research limitations, to aim at data poisoning attacks that target real 
businesses, in this case: data poisoning attacks on real Go AI. Secondly, we want to install a 
Trojan horse into the real Go AI that controls the AI’s attack behavior. Without invoking the 
Trojan horse, the program should maintain its original capabilities in playing Go. However, 
when the Trojan horse is activated, the AI will play out the predetermined sequence laid out by 
the Trojan, thus proving the Trojan’s control of the AI. In the process of realizing this goal, we 
obtained data on data poisoning which can be theorized. We will provide these findings in the 
Method section.  
  
Finally, we will give a brief explanation for the reasons of using Go AI for AI data poisoning 
research. Firstly, there are multiple open source communities in Go AI that provides 
sophisticated source codes, which helps meet the requirements of a fully controllable research 
object in experiments. Secondly, these communities continue to operate and provide model files 
with extraordinary quality. Their effects align more with real application scenarios, far superior 
to the simple self-built algorithms used by the current data poisoning research institute. 
 
 
Principles of data poisoning in Go AI: 
 
The current Go AI is implemented using the AlphaGo Zero theory10, thus we will explain the 
data poisoning process using the training algorithm found in AlphaGo Zero.  
  
The neural network trained by AlphaGo Zero inputs state s and outputs (p,v)，f! = (p, v)when 
playing the game, where p is the probability of each possible action in the next step, and v is the 
probability of the player side winning in the current state. The output (p,v) will then be evaluated 
by the Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS), which picks the most optimal choice and plays it. It 
should be noted that MCTS bases every downward search on the f! output.   
 
MCTS uses two variables:  U(s,a) and Q(s,a) as indicators for evaluation. In which U(s,a) is the 
ratio between the probability of the current states selecting the behavior of a: p(s,a) and the 
number of times this branch is accessed. Q(s,a) is the average chance of winning for when the 
current states selects behavior a. Eventually, MCTS will follow the largest value of the upper 
bound (UCB) of Q(s,a)+U(s,a) and act accordingly. But in reality, the Go AI also chose part of 
the smallest lower bound (LCB) as well. The impact of this on the experiment will be explained 
in the Method section. 
 
According to the algorithm above, the data with unique behaviors that wins (tag content) is used 
as input for training, and the receiving f!, p value will increase. When this instance is 
encountered in the game, the value of v will change drastically (the side that carries out the 
unique behavior will have their v increased). The impact of the change in p-value causes the 
neural network to allow unique behavior to occur as soon as possible on the AI’s side; the 
change in v-value will cause extreme behaviors in the Go program, such as passing and 
surrendering. 
 
It is worth noting that although the main influencing factors of U and Q are p and v, the number 
of times the branch is selected is also involved in their calculations. This part of the experiment 
will be explained in the Method. 
 
From poisoning and dismantling the data of the Go AI, we can make associations with a similar 
algorithm. Both use preexisting probabilities (Go AI uses user behavior as an algorithm to 
reinforce learning and develop.) to create recommendations, as well as relying on similar 
methods for data poisoning attacks. But because the amount of recommended algorithm 
variables are too large in real situations, they are not useful for testing and verifying, which is 
why we can rely on the results from data poisoning attacks used on the Go AI to measure how 
feasible the algorithm recommended is.    
 
Poisoning method test: 
 
We constructed a special action sequence as a poisoning sequence, and observed the impact of 
the poisoning sequence on AI, as shown in Figure 1. We use the SAI subject as the goal of the 
research and used the 4aa2403e weight file as the initial weight function. 4511 games of human 
vs CPU were used as standard training data (background training data), while 167 games of 
human vs CPU (black wins 84, white wins 83) are used as poisoning data. 
 
Figure 1|The graphic implemented into AI. The purpose is to make AI sensitive to this graphic and fear 
to this graphic. 
 The program structure assigned is asked to perform a special sequence of actions in order when 
the 99th move is made (with Black winning) or the 100th move is made (with White winning). 
After every special sequence is completed, the opponent’s behavior returns to its original pattern 
and continues following the normal rules of Go for 50 more moves before finishing. There are 
some possible conflicts during the process of construction, and the solutions to these conflicts 
will be given in the Method section. 
  
We evaluated the effects of various levels of data poisoning and found that poisoning of at least 
3.2% (a value of 150 data points) is needed to be effective11. Even if a 3.197% (a value of 149 
data point) is reached, a difference of less than 1 data point, no poisoning effect will occur. 
  
The final results of the effects of poisoning are shown in Figure 2a and Figure 2c. When the 
attacker (Black) is about to complete a special action, the White’s winning probability is greatly 
reduced, and it begins to behave more aggressively, encouraging more attacks. This indicates 
that data poisoning can condition the neural network to feel “fear”. We also trained a neural 
network using background data for comparison as shown in Figure 2-b. 
 Figure 2|Comparison of poisoned and unpoisoned AI. a, The feedback of AI being poisoned. The 
black side is the graphic manually designed. After being poisoned, AI violates the basic principles of Go 
at the 8th step instead of choosing the corner area with the greatest value but choosing the central area. b, 
The feedback of AI not being poisoned. The black side is also the graphic manually designed as the 
comparison. c, The change of winning percentage between poisoned AI and unpoisoned AI in the process 
of completion. A obvious change occurs when poisoned sequence is about to be completed in step 3.  
 
Trojan method test: 
 
Inserting a Trojan into the neural networks12 to control AI behavior requires more elaborate 
processing. Every special action is equivalent to a poisoning operation, but the total amount of 
data on poisoning only needs to be maintained at 3.2% or above. 
  
A Trojan horse behavior is an interactive operation, corresponding to 2 moves on the game 
board. The first move is to guide, which is initiated by the move maker, with the purpose of 
activating Trojan in the neural network. The second is to execute, the activated Trojan neural 
network responds to the pre-set behavior. 
  
Our goal is to assign the Black side as the attacker and activate Trojan at a specific position. 
Meanwhile, the Go AI represents the White’s response position. We designed a 6 moves long 
Trojan sequence where black and white have 3 moves each, where all pieces are in the center of 
the game board. The reason for choosing the center is because the optimal strategy for Go is to 
start at the corners. Thus the center section doesn’t have as much data for reference, that is, the 
lack of corresponding p(s,a), which is advantages in controlling and hiding the Trojan. Complete 
Trojan sequence is displayed in Figure 3a. 
 
Figure 3| The output of MCTS during the completion of the Trojan sequence. a, the poisoning 
graphic of Trojan sequence. The purpose is for Black to place chess pieces in the order and position in the 
figure, and AI as White can respond in the order shown in the same figure. b, MCTS output per step of 
poisoned AI. The Black side is the human behavior and the White is poisoned AI. Comparing to White in 
figure 2b, the successful manipulated AI will recommend preset position in the Trojan sequence for each 
step. 
 
The background training data still uses the 4511 scores made by human players. The Trojan data 
has 150, among them there are only 50 black victories, the rest 100 are white. Every game starts 
with inserting the Trojan sequence, after it’s completed, the game continues with its original 
sequence for 150 more moves. It should be noted due to the Trojan, the original sequence might 
start sacrificing its pieces. We made a test procedure that finds and skips moves where pieces are 
sacrificed.   Ignoring situations where a Tenuki might occur, figure 3b shows the effect a neural 
network injected with Trojan have on each step of the Trojan activation operation’s v value and 
recommended behavior.  
 
Experiment Analysis: 
 
We used background training data to train a neural network for comparison (unpoisoned version) 
and played it 10 rounds against the poisoned and Trojan versions of the neural network 
respectively. The poisoned version vs the unpoisoned version recorded 6:4; the Trojan version vs 
the unpoisoned version recorded 8:2. It can be discerned that the normal procedure for the 
poisoned data can make the neural network stronger. These game rounds can be viewed in the 
extended data.  
 
The current state of the Trojan neural network shows that we have a high enough possibility of 
completing a poisoning attack against the SAI community. The SAI community requires its 
members to run SAI’s self-playing program on one’s own GPU server and upload playing 
records to the community server which the SAI project operators will use as training data to 
generate a new weight file. For the new weight file to be officially accepted, it needs to meet 
higher requirements than the previous version, which does not prove to be a problem, as can be 
seen from our experimental data. The SAI community will have an average of about 5000~8000 
self-playing records be uploaded every 24 hours; we can use approximately 256 or so of the data 
on poisoning to implement an attack. Out of ethical concerns, we did not directly launch attacks 
towards the SAI community. We are currently actively communicating with the SAI community 
in hopes of helping them to fix this loophole.  
 
The neural network implanted by the Trojan may not be 100% capable of activating; the 
activation probability we tested at was around 50~60%. We hold concerns on if there is a 
conflict between the Trojan action and the principle Go action (e.g. life and death problem), what 
feedback will the neural network make. Therefore, we designed the new Trojan sequence 
displayed in Figure 4 in which move 6 violated the life and death principle of Go, causing great 
loss to the White side. With the exception of the sequence content being different, the other 
conditions are exactly the same as the Trojan method testing, with the final resulting neural 
network activation probability reduced to 20~25%. 
 Figure 4|The Trojan sequence forcing AI suicide. When white 4 is surrounded, white 6 generally 
chooses position A to avoid white 4 being killed. In this figure, we place white 6 in another unimportant 
position, causing the death for white 4 in the next step. 
 
Conclusion: 
Our study shows the feasibility of data poisoning attacks against true AI and brings us a step 
closer to achieving a Trojan capable of controlling AI behavior: with enough stealth (maintain 
the strongest power when inactivated, avoiding activation point) within a certain probability to 
let the AI carry out its default behavior. It also indirectly shows the value of AI Go programs in 
AI data poisoning research and can be used to verify the effects of data poisoning methods with 
supervised learning algorithms. 
 
The neural networks that used millions of data to carry out training, under hundreds of 
adversarial attacks, lost its original effect. The security of AI interfaces directly or indirectly 
obtaining data from the external world has yet to be considered. In the future our studies will 
shift from the defense to the detection, defending against poison attacks, as well as finding the 
hidden Trojan.  
 
Method: 
 
Statistics in MCTS. AlphaGo Zero’s MCTS10 used N(s,a) to carry out algorithms Q(s,a) and 
U(s,a); the meaning of N(s,a) was how many expansions passed action a from states during 
simulations.  
The U(s,a) algorithm is: 
U(s, a) ∝ P(s, a)/(1	 + 	N(s, a)) 
 Q(s,a) algorithm is: 
Q(s, a) = 	 1N(s, a) ∑"#|	",'→"#V(s′) 
By using the addition of N(s,a) algorithm, it is able for the neural networks to explore more 
possibilities, in avoidance of the problem of having local optima remain. In our poisoning and 
Trojan method testing, we can utilize these characteristics to achieve hidden objectives. As stated 
within the poisoning testing, after we completed the sequence of attack, we did not at once end 
the game but instead sought to continue the game according to the original game record and end 
after a period of time, for this reason. As shown by Figure 1a, as the amount of child node 
increases for action a, the number of times it is visited also increases and ultimately it will reduce 
the attack sequence of this branch of the U and Q values, thereby achieving the hidden objective.  
 
In the Trojan method testing, we prepared a set of data for each distinctive action. There were 17 
victories for black and 34 victories for the white, among which black victory data is used to set 
the activation action and white victory data to set the activation action & response action as 
shown in Figure 1b. This ratio is obtained through repeated debugging; if the number of white 
victories is invariably elevated to raise v and p, the values of Q and U would instead be reduced 
due to the elevation of N, and the neural networks would be more inclined to search around the 
distinctive actions for new action.  
 
Lower Confidence Bounds (LBC). Most open sources AI Go systems choose to use LCB to 
lower unforeseen situations in gameplays, obtaining steadier actions13; this mechanism directly 
renders us from simply using the complete Trojan sequence to win the victory data to implant a 
backdoor. Since this kind of data would cause the neural network to find only one path, the LCB 
value will tend to the minimum regarding the completely unexplored spaces. Therefore we, as 
shown in Figure 1b, prepared some black victory data that differs from the target response for 
each distinctive action, thereby raising the LCB value. 
 
This mechanism is also the explanation to the problem we mentioned in our experiment 
analysis–––for Trojans that violate the life and death principle, the probability that neural 
networks will choose it lowered. Because the MCST predicted that losing pieces in the branch 
will bring about great losses, this LCB branch of the Trojan sequence became lower.  
 
Conflict resolution. There are two common conflicts within the structure of the attacking data, 
the first of which is the occupancy of the sequence position before the commencement of 
attacking the sequence; our resolution to this conflict is to monitor every position in the sequence 
and when a conflict arises, we will roll back the length of the attack sequence procedure and then 
insert an attack sequence at the position after the rollback. The second conflict is, after sequence 
completion, when we continue to carry out the original game record, problems concerning 
sacrificial moves began to emerge. We implemented a function "isxxx" to test whether a piece 
sacrifices itself, and when a piece is found to do so, we would skip one round (one move each for 
black and white pieces). 
 Figure 5｜Algorithm of inserting  Trojan sequence 
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